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Abstract 
‘Interoceptive awareness’, defined as the individual’s awareness of internal body 
signals, modulates self/other distinction under conditions of multisensory integration. 
We examined here, for the first time, the potential impact of interoceptive awareness 
on self/other distinction in the motor domain. In automatic imitation, inhibition of 
imitation is an index of an individual’s success in distinguishing internally generated 
motor representations from those triggered by observing another person’s action. This 
is measured by the ‘congruency effect’, which is the difference between mean 
reaction times when the observed action is ‘incongruent’ with the required action and 
when it is ‘congruent’. The present study compared the congruency effect in a typical 
finger lifting paradigm, with interoceptive awareness measured by heartbeat 
perception. Contrary to expectation, interoceptive awareness was positively correlated 
with the congruency effect and this effect depended on mean reaction times in the 
incongruent condition, indicating that good heartbeat perceivers had more difficulty 
inhibiting the tendency to imitate. Potentially, high interoceptive awareness involves 
stronger interoceptive representations of the consequences of an action, implying 
higher empathy, greater motor reactivity in response to observed action and hence a 
greater tendency to imitate. Our results may also tentatively be explained within a 
predictive coding account of interoception.  
Keywords: Automatic imitation; interoceptive awareness; heartbeat perception
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1. Introduction 
The ability to distinguish between self and other is crucial to all aspects of self-
processing and has relevance for action-awareness (Farrer et al., 2003), body-
awareness (Tsakiris, 2013), empathy (Singer et al., 2004) and social cognition 
(Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). In the motor domain, self/other distinction has been 
extensively studied using ‘automatic imitation’ paradigms (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 
2001; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007), where the ability to resist imitating an action 
performed by another person is taken to indicate a stronger sense of self (Spengler, 
Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010). Recent theories propose, however, that the 
self is grounded in ‘interoception’, which refers to the signals arising from within the 
body (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). Awareness of such internal signals 
has been shown to influence the ability to distinguish between self and other in 
multisensory contexts (Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013; Tsakiris, Tajadura-
Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). Given the inter-connectedness of perception and action 
(Friston, 2010; Hommel, 2009) the purpose of this study was to investigate whether 
awareness of interoceptive cues similarly impacts on self/other distinction in the 
domain of action. 
 
Humans have a tendency to involuntarily imitate actions that they observe. Thus, 
when an individual is required to perform a given action, observing another person 
perform an identical action typically facilitates performance, whereas observing a 
different action generally interferes with it, even when the observed action is entirely 
task-irrelevant (see Heyes, 2010, for a review). Although the term ‘automatic 
imitation’ is commonly used, the phenomenon rarely involves true imitation, in that 
people actually seldom perform the wrong action. They must, however, resist a 
tendency to copy the action they observe. The ability to inhibit imitation is measured 
by ‘the congruency effect’, which is the difference between the slower mean reaction 
time (RT) typically found when the required and observed actions are ‘incongruent’ 
(i.e. different) and the faster mean RT when the desired and observed actions are 
‘congruent’ (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000).  
 
According to the Theory of Event Coding, automatic imitation occurs because actions 
are coded in terms of their goals and thus their sensory consequences. The distinction 
between perception and action is thus a false dichotomy (Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) and seeing an action necessarily primes the motor 
representation of that action. The Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) theory 
(Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009), suggests that visual and motor components of 
actions are linked by long-term stimulus response (SR) bonds, such that the activation 
of a visual mental representation necessarily predicts a motor representation (Heyes, 
2010). More recently, the theory of predictive coding has linked perception and action 
within a unified framework that may, in future, elucidate the neural mechanisms 
behind automatic imitation (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2012; Friston, 2010). 
 
Not only does automatic imitation rarely involve imitation but neither is it truly 
‘automatic’, because it is not immune to interference by other processes. According to 
the ASL model (Catmur et al., 2009) these processes can be divided into ‘input 
modulation’, which alters the extent to which the relevant long-term SR bond is 
activated, and ‘output modulation’, where social factors potentially inhibit the 
involuntary imitation (Heyes, 2010). Input modulation is demonstrated by selective 
attention to one’s own actions, which reduces imitation (Bortoletto, Mattingley, & 
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Cunnington, 2013; Chong, Cunnington, Williams, & Mattingley, 2009). Automatic 
imitation also can be reduced by modest amounts of training (Cook, Press, Dickinson, 
& Heyes, 2010; Gillmeister, Catmur, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 
Haggard, 2005; Heyes & Bird, 2007), which reverses the muscle specificity of the 
motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) produced by TMS (Catmur et al., 2007).  
 
Output modulation depends on the top-down influence of participants’ traits and 
social attitudes. Eye contact, or priming with pro-social cues, enhances the 
congruency effect (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2012; 
Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). Similarly, a desire to affiliate to the person 
observed increases automatic imitation in both experimental settings and social 
interaction (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). People scoring high 
in ‘self-monitoring’ (Snyder, 1974), or who have an interdependent self-construal, 
have a greater tendency to mimic others, possibly as an unconscious affiliation 
strategy (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Obhi, Hogeveen, & Pascual-Leone, 2011). 
Interestingly, priming participants with examples of interdependent self-construal 
increases the amplitude of MEPs elicited by TMS (Obhi et al., 2011), indicating that 
these top-down influences increase cortical excitability in the motor areas that 
produce imitation.  
 
Automatic imitation is one of a number of phenomena which involve ‘self/other 
overlap’, defined as “any phenomenon whereby an observer engages a state similar 
to that of the target, via activation of the observer’s personal representations for 
experiencing the observed state, whether through direct perception or simulation” 
(Preston & Hofelich, 2012). These shared representations occur at a very early, 
preconscious, processing stage. The ability to inhibit imitation requires that the 
individual distinguishes between internally generated motor representations and those 
that are triggered by observing other people’s actions (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 
2009). Successfully inhibiting the tendency to imitate activates cortical areas thought 
to be involved in discriminating between self and other (Brass, Derrfuss, & von 
Cramon, 2005; Brass et al., 2009; Brass & Heyes, 2005). The most active of these 
regions - the temporal parietal junction and anterior fronto-median cortex (BA10) - 
are related to perspective taking, feelings of agency and theory of mind (Wang, 
Ramsey, & Hamilton, 2011). Greater activation in BA10 correlates with smaller 
congruency effects and thus with better self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, experimentally increasing self-focus reduces the congruency effect, by 
reducing RTs on incongruent trials (Spengler, Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 
2010). Similarly, observing an action increases the amplitude of MEPs if that action is 
attributed to another individual but reduces cortico-spinal excitability when the action 
is illusorily attributed to the self (Schutz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 
2006). 
 
Automatic imitation can therefore be characterised as a tool to measure how 
effectively the self can be distinguished from others (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 
2009). The purpose of the current experiment was to investigate how the congruency 
effect is linked to ‘interoceptive awareness’ - a fundamental dimension of self-
awareness that has been the focus of recent research in body ownership (Tsakiris et 
al., 2011), self-recognition (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013) and empathy 
(Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011). 
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Recent neuroscientific models of the self emphasize the role of ‘interoception’ (Craig, 
2010; Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Hayes & Northoff, 2012; Panksepp & Northoff, 
2009) defined as “the afferent information arising from within the body, affecting the 
cognition, emotion or behaviour of an organism, with or without awareness” 
(Cameron, 2001). Insular cortex, which is activated by all feelings arising within the 
body (Craig, 2010; Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 
2009; Wiebking et al., 2013; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012), may underpin this 
fundamental representation of self (Craig, 2009; Seth, 2013; but see also Philippi et 
al., 2012). Recent predictive coding accounts of cortical function (Clark, 2013; 
Friston, 2010) similarly propose interoceptive information as an essential component 
of the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). ‘Interoceptive 
awareness’, which is the extent to which internal signals reach consciousness, has 
been extensively studied in relation to emotion, stemming originally from William 
James’ theory that emotion comprises unconscious bodily responses (Damasio & 
Carvalho, 2013; James, 1890).  
 
Recent studies have begun to investigate the contribution of interoceptive awareness 
to self-processing. In the rubber hand illusion, people with low interoceptive 
awareness are more likely to claim ownership over a prosthetic hand, (Tsakiris et al., 
2011) and similarly experience a stronger illusory identification with a stranger’s face 
when they observe that face being stroked synchronously with felt touch on their own 
face (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013). Conversely, enhanced self-focus, through 
mirror self-observation, a self-photograph or self-relevant words, can improve 
interoceptive awareness in people for whom this is initially low (Ainley, Maister, 
Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013; Ainley, Tajadura-Jiménez, Fotopoulou, & 
Tsakiris, 2012; Maister, Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013). Individuals who see a virtual 
image of their own hand (Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013) or of their 
whole body (Aspell et al., 2013) have a greater sense of self-identification with, and 
self-location towards, the image under conditions of cardio-visual synchrony. 
 
Despite these investigations into the contribution of interoceptive awareness to 
self/other distinction in multisensory contexts, little is known about the potential role 
of interoception in the action system, for example in automatic imitation. This lack of 
empirical research is striking, given that human actions are thought to be driven by 
the goal of homeostatic control, which is signaled interoceptively (Craig, 2010; 
Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). Theoretical accounts of the neural basis of perception 
and action stress their inter-connectedness (Friston, 2010; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 
2007). While it has been previously assumed that the sensory consequences of an 
action are primarily exteroceptive, empathy for pain (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & 
Aglioti, 2005; Singer et al., 2004) and overlapping cortical activation during the 
experience, observation or imagination of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) can only be 
explained if actions involve a representation of their interoceptive sensory 
consequences (Heyes & Bird, 2007).  
 
Given that the ability to inhibit automatic imitation seems to index better self/other 
distinction, at the level of visual and motor representation, and also that people with 
high interoceptive awareness appear more reliably able to distinguish their own 
bodies from those of others, at a multisensory level, we hypothesised that in an 
automatic imitation paradigm individuals with high interoceptive awareness would 
successfully inhibit the tendency to imitate, whereas those with low interoceptive 
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awareness would exhibit less self/other distinction and would therefore have a greater 
tendency to automatic imitation. 
 
‘Interoceptive awareness’ is generally assessed using a heartbeat perception task 
(Schandry, 1981; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). Such measures correlate with 
awareness of gastric cues (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012; Whitehead & 
Drescher, 1980). We used the Mental Tracking task (Schandry, 1981) which is well-
validated (Knoll & Hodapp, 1992), with good test retest reliability (Mussgay, 
Klinkenberg, & Rüddel, 1999; Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann, & Duschek, 2013) 
and which discriminates well between individuals. The measure we have called 
‘interoceptive awareness’ in this study assesses the accuracy of cardiac awareness, by 
comparing the subjectively reported number of heartbeats experienced with the 
number (objectively) recorded (Cuenen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2012; Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013). Gender, body mass index (BMI), and resting heart rate were also 
recorded, as possible confounds of the heartbeat perception task (Cameron, 2002). 
Automatic imitation was assessed using an established inhibition imitation paradigm 
developed by Brass and colleagues (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 2009). It was 
anticipated that people who performed accurately in heartbeat perception would also 
be more accurate during the automatic attention task (show a smaller congruency 
effect). However, both these variables might be affected by participants’ general 
willingness and ability to attend to the tests. Attention is a possible source of input 
modulation in automatic imitation (Davis, 1983; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Preston & 
Hofelich, 2012). It has also been reported (Matthias, Schandry, Duschek, & Pollatos, 
2009) that interoceptive awareness is linked to scores on the d2 test (Brickenkamp & 
Zilmer, 1998), which measures individual differences in motivation and attention. We 
accordingly administered the d2 test as a check for this potential confound. 
 
2. Method  
2.1 Ethics statement
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway University of London. All participants gave written informed consent and 
were free to withdraw from the experiment at will. 
2.2 Participants 
Participants were 45 students at Royal Holloway University of London who 
participated for course credit. All declared themselves right handed and had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. The data for 2 participants was excluded for excessive 
numbers of errors (more than 10%, i.e. 3SD above the mean) in the action imitation 
task, indicating a failure to concentrate and follow the instructions. Of the remaining 
43 participants, mean age = 19.6 (SD = 4.9), 9 were male.  
2.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of sequences of 5 frames (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 
2009). Each video stared with a frame showing the hand, which mirrored the right 
hand of the subject, in the starting position, for 2s. The next two frames, each lasting 
34ms, presented a number (either 1 or 2) and simultaneously showed the finger 
movement (if any). The fourth frame showed the finger in the end position for 1.3s, 
with the number (1 or 2) superimposed. Between trials, the screen turned black for 
2.7s. Each video trial was thus 6s duration. The video hand was presented on a blue 
rectangular background, measuring 22 x 12cm. 
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Figure 1. Example of the video stimuli for the index finger, from Brass et al., (2005) 
There were six possible video sequences, consisting of each of the two fingers (index 
or middle) in each of three conditions (baseline, congruent or incongruent). 
Participants were required to lift either the index (1) or middle (2) finger in response 
to a number appearing on the screen. The three possible conditions (for the index 
finger) are shown in Figure 1. Thus in the baseline condition, simultaneous with the 
appearance of the number, the video hand remained static. In the congruent condition 
the video hand lifted the finger that corresponded to the number shown (i.e. the index 
finger was lifted when the number 1 appeared). In the incongruent condition the video 
hand lifted the ‘wrong’ finger (i.e. the middle finger was lifted when the number 1 
appeared).  
 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Interoceptive awareness 
After giving informed consent, participants’ gender, age, height and weight were 
recorded. Heartbeat signals were acquired with a piezo-electric pulse transducer, fitted 
to the participant’s left index finger and connected to a physiological data unit (26T 
PowerLab, AD Instruments) sampling at 1 kHz which recorded the derived electrical 
signal onto a second PC running LabChart6 software (AD Instruments). Instructions 
for the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) were presented over noise-
attenuating headphones. The onset and offset of each heartbeat counting trial were 
cued by the words “go” and “stop”, presented audiovisually. We used a standard 
instruction (Ehlers, Breuer, Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995) whereby participants were 
asked to concentrate hard and try to silently count their own heartbeats, simply by 
“listening” to their bodies, without taking their pulse. The three trials (25s, 35s & 45s) 
were presented in random order. A criticism of the Mental Tracking Method is that 
participants may estimate the elapsed interval and then use knowledge of their own 
heart rate to guess the number of heartbeats. We therefore asked individuals to 
estimate the length of three, randomly presented, intervals (19s, 37s, 49s) and to 
provide an estimate of their resting heart rate (Dunn et al., 2010).  
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2.4.2 Action imitation 
The stimuli were viewed on a standard PC, using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA). Participants were seated about 60 cm in 
front of the screen and were instructed to execute their movements as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Participants placed the index and middle fingers of their right 
hand on a serial response box which was linked to another PC which recorded the 
times of all finger movements, using Spike2 software (Cambridge Electronic Design, 
Cambridge UK). This recorded the onset of the visible stimulus on screen (i.e. the 
number 1 or 2, which coincided with the onset of movement of the video hand) and 
also recorded whenever the participant lifted an index or middle finger. Following 6 
tests trials, 150 trials experimental trials were presented in three blocks of 5mins, with 
obligatory rests of at least 2mins between blocks. The order of the presentation of the 
trials was fully randomised and comprised 25 trials in each of the 6 conditions.  
2.4.3 The d2 test of attention 
Finally, the d2 test was administered (Brickenkamp & Zilmer, 1998). This is a widely 
used measure of selective visual attention. The test items consist of the letters d and p 
with up to four dashes, arranged either individually or in pairs, above and/or below 
each letter. The subject is given 20s to scan across each of the 14 closely printed test 
lines, during which they must identify and cross out every letter d which has exactly 
two dashes, while ignoring all other distractor letters. The d2 test produces several 
norm-referenced scores, of which the most commonly reported are the total number of 
items processed (TN) regardless of whether these are correct or incorrect (this is a 
measure of processing speed), the percentage of errors made (E%) and the total 
number of items processed correctly (TN-E). This final score is designed to provide a 
measure of the capacity to selectively orient to relevant aspects of the task, while 
screening out irrelevant ones. 
 
2.5 Data reduction 
2.5.1 Interoceptive Awareness
LabChart6 was employed to identify and count the number of R-wave peaks on the 
heart trace recorded for each participant in each trial, as well as to calculate the 
average heart rates for each trial (Jennings et al., 1981). Every heart trace was visually 
inspected for artefacts and the number of R-wave peaks was recounted manually, if 
necessary. No participant was excluded due to artefacts. Interoceptive awareness was 
calculated as (1/3 (1-(|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|/recorded 
heartbeats)) (Schandry, 1981). Higher scores indicate higher interoceptive awareness. 
As a control on guessing, the participant’s ability to estimate the length of an elapsed 
interval was also calculated as (1/3 (1-(|estimated elapsed time – actual elapsed 
time|/actual elapsed time)) which we called the “time modulus” measure (Dunn et al., 
2010). 
 
2.5.2 Action imitation 
Data was extracted using Matlab (mathworks.com) and analysed with Microsoft 
Excel. The mean reaction time (RT) was calculated for each of the 6 conditions 
(congruent, incongruent and baseline, for each of the two fingers). The ‘congruency 
effect’ was found by subtracting the mean RT for congruent trials from the mean RT 
for incongruent trials.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Error analysis 
RT errors were removed before analysis. There were 2 possible sources of RT errors. 
Firstly, participants occasionally lifted the wrong finger. Secondly, in common with 
most RT analyses, some response times were omitted as outliers (Miller & Diego, 
1991). Thus RTs less than 80ms or greater than 800ms were excluded from the RT 
analysis (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). The rate for all errors was 2.3% of trials. 
Two participants were excluded for total errors > 10% i.e. 3SD above the mean. The 
distribution of errors was thereafter approximately Normal, skewness = .64, kurtosis = 
-.16.  
 
Paired sample t tests (with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons and a 
significance level of 0.017) showed that there were significantly more errors in the 
incongruent condition than in the baseline, t(42) = 5.07, p < .001, but no significant 
difference between the numbers of errors in the congruent condition and baseline,
t(42) = 0.82, p = .42,  replicating the finding of Brass et al. (2005). 
 
3.2 Reaction Time (RT) Analysis 
Repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with both the finger (index or middle) 
and the condition (congruent, incongruent and baseline) as within-subjects variables. 
Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was significant; therefore Greenhouse Geisser 
corrections were applied. There was a main effect of condition (RTs in the 
incongruent conditions were slower), F(2, 84) = 186.4, p < .001. This indicates 
significant automatic imitation i.e. slower mean RTs in the incongruent than 
congruent condition, for both fingers (Brass et al., 2000; Brass, Derrfuss, & von 
Cramon, 2005). There was a main effect of finger, F(1, 42) = 13.2, p = .001 (reaction 
times were generally faster for the middle finger), as shown in Figure 2. The 
interaction of finger and condition was also significant, F(2, 84) = 8.9, p < .001. 
Paired samples t tests (with Bonferroni correction and a significance level of 0.008) 
showed that, compared with RTs in the baseline, RTs in the incongruent condition 
were significantly longer when participants were required to lift their index finger 
rather than their middle finger, t(42) = 3.32, p = .002. However, there was no 
significant difference between the two fingers for RTs in the congruent condition, 
compared with the baseline, t(42) = .57, p = .57. Despite the significantly shorter RTs 
for the middle finger, particularly in the incongruent condition, the relationships 
between interoceptive awareness and the various reaction time measures in our study 
were very similar for the two fingers. For the remaining analysis we therefore used 
the mean of the data for the index and middle fingers, to give a single measure of 
average RT in each condition.  
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Figure 2. Mean reaction times by condition and by finger (Errors bars = SEM) 
 
To investigate the relationship between interoceptive awareness and the congruency 
effect, we calculated the latter, in the standard way (as the mean RT in the 
incongruent condition minus the mean RT in the congruent condition), for the average 
of the two fingers, for each participant. Correlations between interoceptive awareness 
and differences in RTs between conditions are shown in Table 1. Interoceptive 
awareness was positively correlated with the congruency effect (Figure 3) and this 
was wholly accounted for by RTs in the incongruent condition. Interoceptive 
awareness was significantly correlated with the difference between mean RTs in the 
incongruent condition and the baseline but not with the difference between mean RTs 
in the congruent and baseline conditions.
Figure 3. Scatter diagram of the average congruency effect against interoceptive 
awareness  
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Table 1. Correlations between interoceptive awareness (IA) and RT measures 
IA & ‘the congruency effect’ (mean RT in incongruent condition 
minus the congruent condition) 
 
r = .41 
p = .006** 
IA & mean RT in the incongruent condition minus the baseline r = .45 
p = .002** 
 
IA & mean RT in the congruent condition minus the baseline r = -.04 
p = .73 
** significant at the 1% level 
The wide range of mean RTs amongst our participants (318ms - 513ms, median 
398ms) might have affected our results. We therefore calculated the percentage 
difference in RTs between the incongruent and congruent conditions using the 
formula [{(mean RT incongruent - mean RT congruent)/mean RT baseline} x 100]. 
This statistic was also significantly positively correlated with interoceptive awareness, 
r = .40, p = .008. 
In this experiment we recorded a number of confounding variables known to impact 
on interoceptive awareness, namely gender, Body Mass Index (BMI), resting heart 
rate, and two measures designed to assess possible guessing on the Mental Tracking 
task (i.e. the ‘time modulus’ measure of the participant’s ability to estimate elapsed 
time, and the participant’s belief about his/her heart rate). An independent samples t 
test (with equal variances not assumed) showed no effect of gender on interoceptive 
awareness, t(41) = 1.32, p = .24. Likewise the correlation of interoceptive awareness 
and BMI was not significant, r = -.20, p = .21. Although people with slower hearts are 
often better heartbeat perceivers (Ainley et al., 2012; Cameron, 2001; Knapp-Kline & 
Kline, 2005), in this sample the correlation of interoceptive awareness and average 
heart rate did not reach significance r = -.22, p = .16.  
  
The ‘time modulus’ measure (of participants’ ability to estimate the length of an 
elapsed interval) was correlated with interoceptive awareness, r = .35, p = .02 but the 
correlation of interoceptive awareness and participants’ estimates of their own heart 
rates was not significant, r = -.08, p = .62.
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Table 2. Hierarchical multiple regression with the average congruency effect as the 
dependent variable 
* significant at the 5% level 
** significant at the 1% level 
 
Given previous correlations in the literature between interoceptive awareness and both 
participants’ average heart rates and the ‘time modulus’ measure (Cameron, 2002; 
Dunn et al., 2010), we performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis with the 
average congruency effect as the dependent variable and independent variables 
comprising interoceptive awareness, average heart rate, ‘time modulus’, and their 
interactions. Only interoceptive awareness had any significant effect on the 
congruency effect (see Table 2). 
 
Results of the d2 test of attention were analysed in terms of the total number of items 
processed (TN), total number correct (TN-E) and percentage of errors (E%). 
Compared with published norms, d2 scores for our participants (mean TN = 516, 
mean (TN-E) = 493) were at the 70th percentile for students. Previous research 
(Matthias et al., 2009) found significant correlation between interoceptive awareness 
and TN but in this experiment none of the d2 measures were correlated with 
interoceptive awareness, for TN r = .03, p = .87, for (TN-E) r = .04, p = .82 and for 
(E%) r = -.02, p = .92. To replicate the analysis of Matthias et al. (2009), we split the 
data using their cut off at interoceptive awareness = .85 but found no significant 
difference in any d2 measures between ‘good’ (interoceptive awareness > .85, n = 5) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 
Independent 
variables 
Beta  
(p) 
 
Interoceptive 
awareness (IA) 
 
1.74 
(p = .36) 
1.96 
(p = .16) 
1.90 
(p =.16) 
.52 
(p = .14) 
0.40 ** 
(p = .009) 
0.41** 
(p = .006) 
Average heart 
rate (HR) 
0.22 
(p = .82) 
 
0.26 
(p = .78) 
    
‘Time modulus’ 
 
-0.76 
(p = .64) 
 
-0.66 
(p = .66) 
-0.10  
(p = .29) 
 
  
  
Interaction of 
IA & ‘time 
modulus’ 
 
0.19 
(p = .86) 
 
     
Interaction of 
IA & HR 
 
-1.47 
(p = .31) 
-1.55 
(p = .25) 
-1.49 
(p = .26) 
-.15 
(p = .69) 
  
Interaction of 
‘time modulus’ 
& HR 
 
0.86 
(p = .62) 
0.85 
(p = .62) 
1.22 
(p = .23) 
.15 
(p = .40) 
.11 
(p = .45) 
 
Adjusted R2
(p)
.08
(p = .18) 
.10
(p = .11) 
.13 
(p = .06) 
.12* 
(p = .05) 
.14** 
(p = .02) 
.15**
(p = .006) 
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and ‘poor’ (interoceptive awareness < .85, n = 38) heartbeat perceivers (e.g. for TN, 
F(1, 41) = .46, p = .50). There were likewise no significant correlations between any 
of the d2 measures and the average congruency effect, for TN r = .18, p = .24, for 
(TN-E) r = .11, p = .47, and for (E%) r = .15, p = .32. 
4. Discussion 
We investigated the relationship between interoceptive awareness and automatic 
imitation, measuring interoceptive awareness (IA) with a well-validated heartbeat 
perception task (Schandry, 1981) and automatic imitation by a widely used finger-
lifting paradigm (Brass et al., 2005). The expected ‘congruency effect’ was obtained, 
i.e. mean reaction times (RTs) were slower when the observed and required actions 
were incongruent and were faster when they were congruent (compared with the 
baseline of no observed movement). Interoceptive awareness was significantly 
positively correlated with the congruency effect. This was fully accounted for by the 
difference between RTs in the incongruent condition and the baseline. There were no 
significant effects of interoceptive awareness on RTs difference between the 
congruent and the baseline. Thus the relationship we observed depended on RTs the 
incongruent condition and thus on interference between the observed and required 
action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005), indicating that people with high interoceptive 
awareness had greater difficulty inhibiting the tendency to automatically imitate. Had 
there been a motor facilitation effect, it would have taken the form of shorter RTs on 
congruent trials. RTs in the incongruent condition were significantly slower for the 
index finger than for the middle finger, probably because lifting an index finger is a 
more familiar experience than the isolated lifting of a middle finger, with a 
consequently stronger, learned associative bond. 
 
The result we obtained was contrary to our original hypothesis. Experiments in 
multisensory integration have suggested that people with high interoceptive 
awareness are better at making self/other body ownership distinctions (Tajadura-
Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011). We hypothesized that this effect 
might translate into the motor domain. The ability to inhibit imitation is assumed to 
index self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 2009) and we therefore predicted that 
people with high interoceptive awareness would more successfully inhibit the 
tendency to imitate. Our results show that, on the contrary, they were more inclined to 
imitate, implying greater self/other overlap. 
 
Despite the findings from body-ownership paradigms, which suggest that high 
interoceptive awareness is linked to better ability to make self/other distinctions, this 
is likely to be context dependent. Thus while low interoceptive awareness might 
predict greater ability to distinguish between self and other in cases of multisensory 
body-related integration (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011), in 
other contexts high interoceptive awareness seems to suggest greater self/other 
overlap. A fundamental difference between self/other distinction in the automatic 
imitation task and self/other distinction in the rubber hand illusion is that confusion in 
the automatic imitation task is at a representational level and at a point in time where 
participants have no sensory information about their own movements. The link 
between interoceptive awareness and automatic imitation may therefore be indirect 
and depend on the sensitivity of people with high interoceptive awareness to social 
influences. Thus the concentration of our effect in incongruent cues indicates that it 
depended on the action observation aspect of the task and therefore on output 
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modulation, rather than the preparation of the individual’s own action (input 
modulation). The lack of correlation between the congruency effect and the d2 test 
also supports this conclusion. The d2 test scores are measures of “the capacity to 
selectively orient to relevant aspects of the task while screening out irrelevant ones” 
(Zimmerman & Frimm, 2002). The d2 was included to counter the criticism that if we 
had found the hypothesised correlation between high accuracy in both the heartbeat 
detection and the automatic imitation tasks, this might have reflected the participants’ 
level of motivation and attention. We did not replicate previous reports of a 
correlation between high interoceptive awareness and selective and divided attention 
(Matthias et al., 2009), indicating that general differences in individuals’ motivation 
and attention to the tasks were unlikely to have confounded our results.
 
In terms of the Associative Sequence Learning model of automatic imitation (Catmur 
et al., 2009) output modulation is occasioned by social factors which influence 
individuals to suppress or enhance the tendency to imitate. High interoceptive 
awareness has been linked to anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010) and particularly to 
social anxiety (Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013). We did not assess 
trait anxiety in this study but potentially, if our high interoceptive awareness 
participants were more socially anxious, they might have had a greater desire to 
affiliate, which could have enhanced their tendency to imitate. 
 
A potential source of output modulation is affective empathy, which is assumed to 
involve shared representations between one’s own emotional state and that of another 
individual (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Preston & Hofelich, 2012; Zaki, 
Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). People with high interoceptive awareness are 
thought to exhibit greater empathy (Ernst et al., 2013; Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, 
& Umeda, 2013), perhaps because they have a stronger interoceptive representation of 
the consequences of an observed action, for example, they are more sensitive to 
masked fear conditioning (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001). Scores on the empathetic 
concern scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) correlate with the 
amplitude of heartbeat evoked potentials (Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011), 
which are larger in people with high interoceptive awareness  (Pollatos & Schandry, 
2004). Empathy has, in turn, been linked to action observation. Kaplan and Iacoboni 
(2006) found that when participants observed another individual reaching for a cup, 
inferior frontal mirror activity was greater in those people who had higher scores on 
the Empathetic Concern subscale. Such motor activity in response to action 
observation is also linked to a greater tendency to imitate (Catmur et al., 2007; Obhi 
et al., 2011; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2006). Empathy is inversely correlated with 
narcissism and it has recently been shown that individuals who are high in trait 
narcissism - thus displaying a lack of empathy and concern for others - have a greater 
ability to inhibit automatic imitation (Obhi, Hogeveen, Giacomin, & Jordan, 2013). 
Thus high interoceptive awareness may involve stronger interoceptive representation 
of the consequences of an action, implying higher empathy, greater mirror neuron 
activity in response to observed action and hence a greater tendency to imitate.  
 
Our results may alternatively depend on some hitherto unexplored aspect of 
interoceptive awareness and its relationship to the action system. Given that accounts 
of cortical function, including both the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel, 2009) and 
predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010) stress that perception and action are 
reciprocally connected, further research is needed to confirm whether interoceptive 
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awareness impacts not only on action in interoceptive systems but on motor activity 
as well. The basis of inter-individual differences in interoceptive awareness is not 
well understood (Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). Such differences have 
generally been assumed to depend simply on the strength of interoceptive signals 
arising within the body, which are conveyed principally by the vagus nerve (Craig, 
2003; Cameron, 2002; Critchley et al., 2007). However, interoceptive awareness may 
perhaps be interpreted in a predictive coding context (Friston, 2010; Seth et al., 2011).  
 
Hypothetically, high interoceptive awareness might relate to the high ‘precision’ of 
interoceptive signals, which could, in turn, account for the high levels of autonomic 
activity that have been observed in people with good interoceptive awareness 
(Herbert, Pollatos, Flor, Enck, & Schandry, 2010; Pollatos, Füstös, & Critchley, 
2012). Although very speculative, it seems possible that interoceptive signals are 
more reliable and attended (i.e. more precise) in people with high interoceptive 
awareness, which would account for these individuals’ reduced liability to body 
ownership illusions. Given that interoceptive awareness affects perception of the 
body, it is also likely to modulate action representations. It has recently been indicated 
that in order to avoid mirroring another person’s actions it is essential to reduce the 
precision of proprioceptive precision errors (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011). If 
people with high interoceptive awareness have initially precise proprioceptive 
precision errors, then their tendency to imitate others may be accounted for. 
Potentially, recently observed individual differences in levels of neurotransmitters in 
the insula (e.g. Wiebking et al., 2013) may provide the means to unravel the links 
between interoceptive signals and proprioceptive, motor and autonomic reflexes.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Interoceptive awareness, measured by the accuracy with which people perceive their 
own heartbeats, is known to modulate self/other distinction in multisensory contexts. 
Here we demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive awareness also impacts on 
shared representations in the motor domain, such that people with high interoceptive 
awareness have greater difficulty in inhibiting the tendency to imitate, in a standard 
automatic imitation paradigm.  
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Highlights 
 Interoceptive awareness modulates self/other distinctions in body-awareness 
tasks. 
 Automatic imitation also indexes the ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’. 
 In a finger-lifting task, good heartbeat perceivers had larger ‘congruency 
effects’. 
 Interoceptive awareness correlated with difficulty in inhibiting imitation. 
